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The purpose of this thesis is to create a simple model, called the Religious 
Extremism Manifestation Model (REMM), that will help identify whether specific 
conditions in Bulgaria are favorable for the emergence of Islamic extremism and 
terrorism. Building on fundamentalist theory, and Gregg’s insights into the causes of 
religious violence, the REMM model focuses on four variables—groups and leaders, 
intentions, capabilities, and targets—as necessary conditions for religiously motivated 
terrorism.  
Using the REMM model to analyze the potential for the growth of Islamically 
motivated terrorism in Bulgaria, the thesis argues that the Bulgarian government needs to 
increase the following: funding and cooperation between security services; a better 
understanding of its Muslim minority in order to decrease their sense of alienation; 
resources and services for minorities that can compete with Islamic non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs); cooperation with the EU to devise a strategy for managing 
immigrants; and monitoring the presence of foreign influence, including Islamic NGOs, 
Bulgarians studying in Islamic schools abroad, and influential materials that could 
promote religiously motivated terrorism.  
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The end of the Cold War created a major shift in global politics and security 
threats. After a decade of relative calm, September 11 ushered in a new era in which 
violent conflicts would no longer be solely between superpowers, or even states, but 
between states and non-state actors. The new global environment where people, 
information, culture, ideas, and money can move freely has created opportunities for non-
state actors, especially transnational terrorists and their supporters. These challenges 
require states to adopt new policies towards ensuring their security.  
One of the greatest threats to state and regional security comes from the rise of 
religious extremism, particularly radical Islam. This is true not only in the Middle East 
and in Muslim-majority regions such as South Asia, but also in the Balkans.1 According 
to terrorism expert Saul Shay, the presence of a considerable Muslim population on the 
Balkan Peninsula “fits in well with the global vision of Al Qaeda and its affiliates, which 
aspire to achieve the triumph of Islamic culture over Western culture (and other Islamic 
foes), and to establish the ‘Umma’—the community of faithful Muslims which will unite 
all Muslims and position Islam as the main global force.”2 Historically, the Muslim 
population on the Balkans is mainly the descendants of Turkish Sunni Muslims. 
However, with the conflicts in Syria and Iraq, Muslim migrants have begun to change the 
ethnic and religious landscape of the Balkans, as have the increasing influences from 
neighboring Muslim countries and states in the Arabian Peninsula. These changes in both 
the Muslim population and new external influences have presented challenges for state 
security, and new opportunities for Islamically motivated transnational terrorists.     
                                                 
1 Europol, European Law Enforcement Agency, European Union Situation and Trend Report 2015, 
(The Hague: European Police Office, July 6, 2015), https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/european-
union-terrorism-situation-and-trend-report-2015. 
2 Shaul Shay, Islamic Terror and the Balkans (New Brunswick, NJ; London: International Policy 
Institute for Counter-Terrorism, 2007), 202. 
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As a country located in the center of the Balkan Peninsula, Bulgaria has 
successfully maintained a relatively peaceful coexistence with its ethnic and religious 
groups throughout the last millennia. However, with the rise of transnational terrorism 
and a shift in ethnic and religious demographics in Bulgaria, this relationship is changing. 
In 2013, the U.S. Department of State reported that the terrorist threat is increasing for 
Bulgaria. The report stated that “an influx of asylum seekers from Syria has exacerbated 
border security challenges, raised interethnic tensions, and challenged underfunded state 
agencies.”3 The concerns of the U.S. Department of State that foreign fighters could 
blend in with the flow of migrants who move in and out of Bulgaria remains in the 
country report to date.4 In addition to the U.S. State Department report, the Islamic State 
of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) released a map in 2014, which “outlines the territory they aspire 
to conquer within next five years”; Bulgaria is included in their plans.5 Balkan journalist 
Dusica Tomovic provides further evidence of Bulgaria’s potentially rising threat posed 
by Islamic terrorism, citing a CIA report that suggests the number of Balkan Muslims 
who want to join ISIS is growing; in fact, Balkan Muslims are just behind Jordan, Saudi 
Arabia, and Tunisia.6 In addition to the threat posed by ISIS, the Muslim population in 
Bulgaria is exposed to the ideas of Islamization from neighboring countries, such as 
Turkey—which looks at Bulgaria as a former territory and has a history of influencing the 
Muslim communities there—and from states in the Arabian Gulf that provide money and 
other resources to Muslim minorities.7   
                                                 
3 U.S. Department of State, “Country Report: Europe Overview,” in Country Reports on Terrorism 
2013, Chapter 2, accessed December 2, 2014, http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2013/224822.htm. 
4 U.S. Department of State, “Country Report: Europe Overview,” in Country Reports on Terrorism 
2014, Chapter 2, accessed July 17, 2015, http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2014/239406.htm. 
5 Frances Martel, “Isis Releases Map of 5-Year Plan to Spread from Spain to China,” Breitbart, July 1, 
2014, http://www.breitbart.com/national-security/2014/07/01/isis-releases-map-of-5-year-plan-to-spread-
from-spain-to-china/. 
6 Dusica Tomovic, “Hundreds of Balkan Jihadists Have Joined ISIS,” Balkan Insight, September 17, 
2014, http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/hundreds-of-balkan-jihadist-reportedly-joined-isis. 
7 Alex Alexiev (Chairman of the Centre for Balkan and Black Sea Studies in Sofia, Bulgaria, fellow at 
the Hudson institute, worked for RAND Corporation, and as advisor at the Pentagon and CIA), “The End 
of Erdogan’s Islamization,” National Review Online, January 18, 2014, 
http://www.nationalreview.com/node/368583/print. 
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B. PURPOSE AND SCOPE 
The purpose of this thesis is to create a simple model, called the Religious 
Extremism Manifestation Model (REMM), that will help identify whether specific 
conditions in Bulgaria are favorable for the emergence of Islamic extremism and 
terrorism. The model focuses on four variables in particular: the creation of groups, 
which consist of leaders and followers; intentions, especially radical interpretations of a 
faith that call for violence; the acquisition of capabilities that can lead to violence; and 
the selection of targets for terrorist acts. This thesis asserts that the presence of these four 
variables produce a high threat for terrorist acts done in the name of religion. 
Furthermore, this thesis aims to use this model to assess the prospects for greater Islamic 
extremism and terrorism in Bulgaria.  
This thesis uses academic and policy literature to build this model, specifically 
Fundamentalist Theory, which looks at perceptions of threat to a religion and the literalist 
interpretations of scripture and the acts of violence these perceptions produce, along with 
Gregg’s four variables of religiously motivated violence—context, leaders, followers, and 
resources—and the violent interpretations they produce.8 The thesis begins with an 
examination of the social, political and economic environment surrounding Muslim 
communities in Bulgaria. It discusses the Communist government’s attempts at 
assimilation and “Bulgarization” of the Muslim population, and the reaction of these 
groups to the government’s campaigns, particularly in the 1980s. The thesis also includes 
recent trends among the Bulgarian Muslim minority, including the effects of external 
actors on the community. The thesis concludes by applying the proposed model to the 
Bulgarian case, in an attempt to identify key changes that may affect the Muslim minority 
in Bulgaria and the conditions under which these Muslims may become radicalized and a 
threat to state security. 
                                                 
8 Heather Gregg, The Path to Salvation: Religious Violence from the Crusades to Jihad (Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press, 2014), 19. 
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C. FINDINGS 
Using the REMM model to assess the potential for Islamically motivated 
terrorism in Bulgaria, this thesis proposes the following areas of concern for the 
Bulgarian government and security forces. First, regarding the potential of groups and 
leaders, the Bulgarian government should pay particular attention to Muslim minority 
groups who live in concentrated isolated areas, and especially to groups who may be 
receiving aid and education from Islamic charities. Muslim Roma in city slums and the 
“Bulgarian Mohamedans” (Pomaks) are two particular groups of concern.  
Second, with regard to intentions, the government and security forces should pay 
particular attention to Muslim schools that are popping up in Muslim communities, 
particularly ones not registered by the government and yet receiving foreign aid and 
teaching conservative Muslim ideas and values. The government should also monitor 
religious students who study abroad, including where they are studying and how they are 
using their religious education once they return home.  
Third, with respect to resources, the Bulgarian government and security forces 
should work to monitor criminal groups and smugglers for the influx of weapons that 
could be used for terrorist activities. Also, identifying vulnerabilities of the Muslim 
minorities in the country and addressing these vulnerabilities as best as possible, 
particularly among groups that lack basic resources, is important for reducing grievances 
and the influx of foreign influence.  
Finally, with regard to potential targets of Islamic terrorists in Bulgaria, the 
government and security forces should improve security in the Pamporovo winter resort, 
which is located in the middle of the Rhodope Mountain (where Pomaks are 
concentrated); and the Varna airport; Black Sea resorts; and Bulgaria’s nuclear power 
plant and oil refinery. 
Improving Bulgarian security against the threat of Islamically motivated terrorism 
will most likely be challenged by the following four key factors: a small number of 
security forces and lack of interagency cooperation; underfunded official Muslim 
organizations in Bulgaria; the lack of a database of foreign Islamic non-governmental 
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organizations (NGOs) and Islamic students abroad; the underfunded State Agency for 
Refugees; and poorly integrated Muslim minorities in the country.   
D. OUTLINE OF THESIS 
The thesis proceeds as follows. Chapter II provides a brief overview of key 
literature on religiously motivated violence. It focuses specifically on fundamentalism 
theory and Gregg’s conditions that lead to interpretations of faith that call for violence. 
From this literature review, the chapter presents a basic model of radicalization and 
terrorism to analyze the Muslim minority in Bulgaria. The model focuses on four 
variables in particular: the creation of groups, which consist of leaders and followers; 
intentions, especially radical interpretations of a faith that call for violence; the 
acquisition of capabilities that can lead to violence; and the selection of targets for 
terrorist acts. 
Chapter III provides a brief overview of Bulgaria, particularly the historical 
events that created the country’s religious and ethnic diversity and its Muslim minority in 
particular. This chapter also discusses contemporary religious and ethnic demographics 
of Bulgaria. Finally, the chapter highlights major violent acts in Bulgaria from 1980 to 
the present.  
Chapter IV uses each of the variables in the model to assess the potential for 
Islamically motivated terrorism in the country. Specifically, it addresses the role that 
changing demographics and external influence in Bulgaria may have for transforming the 
country’s Muslim minority into potential security threats.  
  
 6 
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II. RELIGIOUSLY MOTIVATED TERRORISM AND THE 
REMM MODEL 
This chapter provides a brief overview of key literature on religiously motivated 
violence, including terrorism caused by radical interpretations of religion, and uses this 
literature to build a basic model of radicalization and terrorism with which to analyze the 
Muslim minority in Bulgaria.   
It begins with literature on the causes of religious violence, paying particular 
attention to fundamentalism theory and Gregg’s four variables for investigating 
religiously motivated violence—context, leaders, followers, and resources. From this 
discussion, the chapter then proposes a basic model, called the Religious Extremism 
Manifestation Model (REMM) that will help identify whether specific conditions favor 
the emergence of Islamic extremism and terrorism in Bulgaria. The model focuses on 
four variables in particular: the creation of groups, which consist of leaders and 
followers; intentions, especially radical interpretations of a faith that call for violence; the 
acquisition of capabilities that can lead to violence; and the selection of targets for 
terrorist acts. 
A. CAUSES OF RELIGIOUSLY MOTIVATED VIOLENCE 
Several scholars offer theories that attempt to explain the conditions under which 
violence and terrorism are committed in the name of religion. The research of 
Juergensmeyer; Almond, Appleby, and Sivan; Robins and Post; and Gregg provides 
particularly useful theories to explain the rise of religiously motivated violence and 
terrorism.  
Perhaps the most well-known scholar of religiously motivated violence is 
sociologist Mark Juergensmeyer, who asserts that religious violence is the earthly 
manifestation of a symbolic, eternal battle between good and evil depicted in most 
religious scriptures—what he calls “cosmic war.” This war can never be lost, but it is 
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often not winnable in this lifetime.9 Those who participate in this cosmic battle of good 
versus evil are participating in a battle that is both personal and much greater than 
themselves. Those who die in battle are martyrs of the faith. Therefore, Juergensmeyer 
argues that when the ideas of sacred battles are brought to earthly battlefields, the conflict 
automatically transforms into a cosmic war.   
Robins and Post build on these observations to argue that charismatic leaders play 
a particularly important role in what they call apocalyptic war. They argue that, during 
difficult times, people tend to look for support in and find salvation from religion.10 
Charismatic leaders are able to provide guidance to followers and hope in times of crisis. 
Charismatic leaders also are able to interpret scriptures, including those justifying 
violence, and persuade followers to take action. 
Another set of theories focuses on what is commonly called “fundamentalism.” 
Most Christians and Westerners tend to think of the word “fundamentalism” in a negative 
way. They associate it with something bad, such as the dark side of a religion, as with 
Islam, or with terrorism. Esposito notes that people often perceive fundamentalism as 
expressing the eternal war between Christianity and Islam, which is rooted back into 
human history.11 However, most scholars argue that fundamentalism is a fairly new 
phenomenon, which “emerged from the Abrahamic faiths—Judaism, Christianity, and 
Islam.”12 In that regard, despite what those religions profess, fundamentalist movements 
constitute a reaction against perceived or real threats to the faith. For fundamentalists, the 
Holy Scriptures are both absolute truth and the foundation of the believers’ faith. In this 
sense, fundamentalism is any movement that calls for strict and literal adherence to 
fundamental religious principles. 
                                                 
9 Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 
161. 
10 Robert Robins and Jerrold Post, Political Paranoia (New Haven; London: Yale University Press, 
1997), 114. 
11 John Esposito, The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality?, 3rd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1999), 1. 
12 Gabriel Almond, Scott Appleby, and Emmanuel Sivan, Strong Religion: The Rise of 
Fundamentalism around the World (Chicago; London: University Of Chicago Press, 2003), 92. 
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Even in secular states, religion is an important component of the society. 
However, fundamentalists feel obliged to ensure that their religion does not erode in the 
modern world. Therefore, fundamentalists want to protect the “orthodoxy (right belief) or 
orthopraxis (right behavior).”13 They fight to preserve religious practices and to protect 
religion from secularization and from new ideological influences. At the same time, 
fundamentalists use the modern world’s various innovations to protect the old traditions, 
even to create new ideologies of their own. The Internet is an example of how new 
technology is widely used by fundamentalists to spread their ideas and to recruit new 
members. Although, fundamentalists utilize innovative ways to struggle against the 
forces of erosion, they claim that they base every fighting method on their sacred past.14  
Almond, Appleby, and Sivan propose that fundamentalism has nine principles: 
five ideological (reactivity to the marginalization of religion, selectivity, moral 
Manichaeism, Absolutism and inerrancy, millennialism, and messianism) and four 
organizational (elect, chosen membership; sharp boundaries; authoritarian organization; 
and behavioral requirements).  
It is a common misconception that militant passages in religious scriptures 
motivate religious violence. Gregg, however, argues that these passages “are, by 
themselves, not sufficient for explaining religiously motivated violence,” but the 
interpretations by religious leaders are the primary cause of religious violence,15 along 
with the socio-political circumstances in which individuals’ lives shape their perceptions 
and interpretations of holy texts. Therefore, one needs to understand the conditions and 
the environment under which the individuals draw the interpretations that lead to 
violence. Also, the individuals who make these interpretations must have authority and 
resources in order to inspire followers. In her research Gregg determines four variables 
that explain the reasons and motives for religious violence: context, leaders, followers, 
and resources.16  
                                                 
13 Almond, Appleby, and Sivan, Strong Religion, 92. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Gregg, Path to Salvation, 19. 
16 Ibid., 31. 
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To understand and investigate the conditions that call for religious violence, 
Gregg asks several important questions for each variable: “What are the social and 
political circumstances under which these interpretations are being generated? Who is 
interpreting the faith, and by what authority? Why are adherents to the faith embracing 
these interpretations as true? What resources are necessary for interpretations to become 
violent reality?”17 The answers to these questions could provide the reasons why 
religiously motivated violence occurs in the first place. 
Although the last three categories—leaders, followers, and resources—are clear 
and self-explanatory, the first one, the context, is broad and includes many factors, 
ranging from the economic, social, religious, and political environment. Simply 
understanding the environment does not provide information on why a particular group 
uses violence as a reaction against a real or perceived threat. In most societies there are 
different religious or ethnic groups, who live under the same social, political and 
economic conditions, but not every group turns to violent means. This shows that the 
leaders’ views shaped by the socio-political situation or context are a significant, but not 
sufficient factor for violence, and other variables are needed.  
Building on these observations, this thesis proposes that it is important to 
understand the conditions that inspire violent intentions in the minds of religious leaders. 
Leaders, in turn, channel these ideas and direct them towards violent acts. Therefore, not 
only are the leaders’ worldviews important, but also their intentions. Extremist views 
alone will not cause religiously motivated violence and terrorism; the combination of 
extreme ideas and the desire to take action and perpetrate specific acts of violence are 
what produce religiously motivated violence. 
B. REMM MODEL 
Building on the principles of fundamentalism theory and Gregg’s four variables 
of religiously motivated violence—context, interpretations, leaders and followers, and 
resources—a basic causal argument can be articulated.  
                                                 
17 Gregg, Path to Salvation, 20. 
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PRЕ = f (GRЕ, СRЕ, IRЕ, TRЕ) – Religious Extremism Manifestation Model 
     
PRЕ – Possibility of violent religious extremism; 
GRЕ – Existence of religious extremist group; 
СRЕ – Capabilities of religious extremists and group; 
IRЕ – Intentions of religious extremists and group; 
TRЕ – Targets of the extremist’s violent acts. 
The first variable GRЕ (Group’s Existence) proposes that significant terrorist 
attacks cannot occur without the aid of a group. Groups provide organization and the 
accumulation of resources, learning, and emotional support to individuals. Furthermore, 
groups are dangerous because they can sustain a movement and its violent intents beyond 
a single attack. Much has been made of “lone wolf attacks”—individuals who act on their 
own without the aid of a group. However, the most deadly and disruptive terrorist attacks 
to date have still been perpetrated by groups, not individuals, including the 9/11 attacks in 
the United States, the Bali bombings in 2002, the London attacks in 2005, and so on. 
Therefore, law enforcement should focus its efforts on identifying and targeting groups.   
The second variable СRЕ (Capabilities) describes the capabilities of the existing 
religious extremist group. It includes the level of the extremists’ knowledge, their 
criminal or terrorist experience, financial support, weapons (small arms, explosives etc.) 
and other sources needed for conducting terrorist acts. There is a particular set of 
resources, which should be investigated, specifically “material resources,” such as 
money, real estate, and ties to the military; “social resources,” including networks and 
organizations; and “technological resources,” such as transportation and 
communication.18 Ultimately, resources allow the religious groups to increase the variety 
of means and methods of violent acts.  
The third variable IRЕ (Intentions) includes the aim of the religious extremist 
group and desired effects of the terrorist act. This variable could include some of the 
ideological traits of fundamentalism articulated by Almond et al., such as reactivity to the 
marginalization of religion; moral Manichaeism; millennialism; and messianism. It is 
                                                 
18 Ibid., 31. 
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also this variable that determines whether groups are religious in their motives or have 
other motives like ethnic grievances.  
These ideological characteristics are shaped by the socio-political environment, 
which corresponds to the “context” variable articulated by Gregg. She argues that the 
environment shapes leaders views, and it is leaders who call for violence. However, this 
thesis asserts that the views of leaders are necessary but no sufficient factor. Therefore, 
this thesis also offers the idea that leaders should have violent intentions.  
The sequence of capabilities and intentions is interchangeable. For example, the 
group could build first its capabilities and then pursue its goals. But if the leaders first 
react to a particular situation with violent intentions, then the leaders can purposely start 
building capabilities. The difference between these two cases is that, when the group 
already has capabilities, it can immediately react to perceived or real threats. In the 
second case, even though the group has violent intentions, it needs time to acquire the 
required capabilities in order to achieve its goals.     
TRЕ (Targets) is the last variable in the proposed model. Although this variable is 
not covered by the fundamentalist theory or Gregg’s framework, this thesis argues that 
until the movement chooses a target against which to channel its violent intentions, it 
cannot act. Therefore, target selection is a necessary part of a terrorist act. This model is 
shown in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1.  Time and threat analysis of the religious extremism transformation 
into terrorism  
 
 
The level of threat can be further evaluated by the presence of the model’s 
variables, included in the threat evaluation matrix in Table 1.  
Table 1.   Threat evaluation matrix 
Threat / Risk Variables / Determinants GRE СRE IRE TRE 
Low Yes  No No No 
Moderate Yes Yes No No Yes No Yes No 
High Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
 
Following the designed matrix, the level of threat can be estimated as Low if only 
the variable GRЕ represents the existing of some extremist individuals or groups. Without 
the rest of the determinants, we can conclude that there is no current real threat. After 
achievement of proper capabilities СRЕ, the combination of the presence of both variables 
GRЕ and СRЕ turns the threat to the moderate level. A high level of threat includes the 
presence of the variables GRЕ, СRЕ, and IRЕ.  
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C. CONCLUSION 
This chapter provided a brief overview of key literature on religiously motivated 
violence. From this literature, it developed a model for identifying the emergence of 
religiously motivated groups with terrorist aims. The next chapter highlights the history 
of Islam in Bulgaria, the emergence of Bulgaria’s Muslim minority groups, and trends in 




III. HISTORY OF ISLAM IN BULGARIA 
This chapter reviews the most important events in Bulgarian history related to the 
religious and ethnic divisions in the country, with the goal of better understanding the 
current tensions in Bulgarian society, and the potential for Islamically motivated 
terrorism. 
The chapter begins by providing a brief overview of the Bulgarian state. It then 
considers the Muslim minority in Bulgaria, followed by a detailed analysis of terrorist 
acts in Bulgaria, beginning in the 1980s. Overall, this chapter finds that terrorist incidents 
in Bulgaria began in the 1980s, partially in reaction to policies to “Bulgarize” Muslim 
minorities. Following Bulgaria’s independence in 1989, two prominent political parties 
were formed to help address the grievances of the country’s Muslim minorities. Recent 
terrorist acts have come not from Bulgaria’s Turkish minorities, but rather from outsiders 
and those affiliated with the Islamic State.  
A. BRIEF HISTORY OF BULGARIA 
Bulgaria is one of the oldest states in Europe, officially established in 681 AD on 
the Balkan Peninsula. The first citizens were mainly representatives of three ethnic tribes: 
Thracians, Slavs, and Bulgarians. The rise of the Byzantine Empire compelled these 
different tribes to unite, with Bulgarians assuming leadership; however, Europe and the 
Byzantine Empire considered Bulgarians inferior because of the pagan nature of the 
country.19 Bulgarian leaders realized that the use of military power was not enough to 
maintain the country’s independence. Therefore, in 865 AD, Khan Boris adopted 
Christianity as the one and the only religion for the people, “which had a profound and 
far-reaching effect on Bulgarian history.”20 Khan Boris had a higher aim, however; not 
only did he want to achieve political recognition on the international stage, but he also 
wanted to create one nation united by faith, Eastern Orthodox Christianity. That same 
                                                 
19 Republic of Bulgaria, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Consulate General of the Republic of Bulgaria in 
Los Angeles, USA, accessed June 23, 2015, http://www.mfa.bg/embassies/usagc2/bg/1883/index.html5.  
20 Stanley Evans, A Short History of Bulgaria (London: Lawrence & Wishart Ltd., 1960), 40. 
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year, Khan Boris was baptized under the name of Michael after the Byzantine Emperor 
Michael, who was the new Bulgarian king’s sponsor. From that time forward, Orthodox 
Christianity has been the official religion of Bulgaria.21 
During the Middle Ages, Crusaders passed through Bulgaria on their way to the 
Holy Land, making the region unstable. In 1352, in the midst of the decline of the 
Byzantine Empire, the Ottoman Turks took advantage of the weakened Balkans and 
started their invasion of Europe. The Turks, through small but decisive steps, successfully 
conquered the whole Balkan Peninsula and parts of Eastern Europe. Thus, from 1396 to 
1878, Bulgaria was under Turkish rule. During this period of history, the Turks destroyed 
many Bulgarian fortresses and cultural monuments; they also burned villages and 
massacred some of the Christian population.22 The impact on Bulgarian culture was 
significant. As Stanley Evans describes, “The normal development of the Bulgarian 
people was interrupted and a severe blow was struck at its economic life and its 
civilization.”23 However, almost 500 years of rule and brutal practices could not break 
the Bulgarian spirit and identity. During these difficult times, Orthodox Christianity and 
religious leaders played an important role in saving the Bulgarian nation. After the 
Russo-Turkish War in 1878, Bulgaria was proclaimed, for the third time in its history, an 
independent state. Many ethnic Turks, who were Muslim, did not leave the country, and 
they became Bulgarian citizens. Thus, the Bulgarian Muslim community was created.    
After the Second World War, Bulgaria came under Soviet influence. The 
Bulgarian communist government had one goal, to create a secular state united by ideas 
of socialist nationalism. The active practice of religions was forbidden.24 The Bulgarian 
Communist party attempted to further unite the population through a process of 
“Bulgarization.” For example, in 1960, the Communist government adopted the new 
“Law on Names,” which forced citizens with no Bulgarian background to change their 
                                                 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid., 70. 
24 Robert Lee Wolff, The Balkans in Our Time (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967), p 
550. 
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names to ones that were more Bulgarian.25 However, Bulgarization was slow to take 
root. In 1985, a few supporters of this policy, who were part of the Communist party’s 
nomenklatura,26 decided that the time for decisive measures had come. Often with the 
use of force, Turks in Bulgaria were compelled to change their names from Turkish to 
Bulgarian. Those who refused were forced into exile or imprisoned. The resistance was 
strong and resulted in numerous deaths, with no official data on the number of victims. 
As a continued effort at Bulgarization in 1989, the Bulgarian authorities forced the 
Turkish minority to leave the country and move to Turkey; however, not all of them left; 
significant numbers remain in specific areas, which are discussed below.27 
These policies of Bulgarization largely stopped with the fall of the Soviet Union 
in 1991 and Bulgaria’s transition to democracy. However, as Bulgarian scholar Nikolov 
asserts, today’s Turkish minority in Bulgaria, “instead of being a bridge between the two 
states,” is used as an instrument of political leverage between Turkey and Bulgaria.28    
B. CURRENT MUSLIM MINORITIES 
The current Muslim population of Bulgaria consists mainly of three ethnic 
groups: Turks, Roma (Gypsies), and Bulgarian Mohmmedans (Pomaks). Even though 
Pomaks constitute 1 percent of the population, the Bulgarian government still does not 
officially recognize them as a minority. As seen from the 2011 census data, Muslims 
comprise approximately 8 percent of the population.29 Each of these groups is described 
in further detail below.  
                                                 
25 Stephan Nikolov, “Integration of the Ethnic Minorities in the Bulgarian Armed Forces” (Sofia: 
Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, 1996), 8, http://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/95-97/nikolov.pdf. 
26 This word is used to describe the Bulgarian communist party elite. 
27 “Assimilation of Bulgaria’s Turkish Minority,” accessed September 30, 2015, http://assimilation-of-
turks-in-bg.tumblr.com/. No date 
28 Nikolov, “Integration of Ethnic Minorities,” 8. 
29 National Statistical Institute of Bulgaria, “2011 Population Census,” 2, accessed July 20, 2015, 
http://www.nsi.bg/census2011/PDOCS2/Census2011final_en.pdf. 
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1. The Turks 
The historical evidence shows that Turkish tribes started to invade the Balkan 
Peninsula and Asia Minor in the early third and fourth centuries AD, prior to the 
establishment of Islam.30 Migration continued even after Bulgaria adopted Christianity as 
its official state religion in the ninth century. Turkish tribes, which were mostly Muslim, 
further settled in Bulgaria during Byzantine rule from 1018–1185 AD. This population 
included the Pecheneg, Uzes, and Cuman tribes, which massively invaded the Balkans. 
The last and the most significant wave of migration occurred during the Ottoman 
conquest of the Balkan states during the fourteenth century.  
Within this history, there is the narrative that Turks in Bulgaria engaged in brutal, 
large-scale forced (or in some places voluntary) conversion to Islam. During the Cold 
War, the Communist government in Bulgaria used this narrative in its assimilation 
campaigns, claiming that there was no Turkish ethnicity, but “Turkicized” Bulgarians, 
which justified their policy of Bulgarization or re-Bulgarization of these people. The 
Communist party’s Bulgarization policies included a ban on Muslim dress, the Turkish 
language, and religious practices. The campaign went so far as to even change the names 
of dead people in Muslim graveyards.31 Despite these attempts at forced assimilation, the 
Communist regime had only minor successes in eradicating the Turkish Muslim 
minority.32 Although suppressed, the Turkish minority group succeeded in protecting and 
keeping its identity and language alive.33 
In addition to Turkish identity, Islam conflicted with communist ideology and the 
Communist party perceived Islam as a potential threat to its socialist aims. However, the 
Communist party claimed that the religion was dangerous and that Muslims were 
                                                 
30 Fatme Muyhtar, The Human Rights of Muslims in Bulgaria in Law and Policies since 1878 (Sofia: 
Bulgarian Helsinki Committee, November 2003), 5, 
http://www.bghelsinki.org/media/uploads/special/muslims-2003.pdf. 
31 Lillia Petrova, “The Integration Process of the Turkish Minority in Bulgaria in the Post-Cold War 
Era,” 2002, http://www.kakanien-revisited.at/beitr/fallstudie/LPetkova1.pdf. 
32 Muyhtar, Human Rights of Muslims, 5. 
33 Laura Olson Osterman, “Movements for Islam Revival and Ethnic Consciousness among Rural 
Bulgarian Muslims in the Post-Communist Period,” 7, accessed May 11, 2015, 
http://www.ucis.pitt.edu/nceeer/2014_828-10g_Osterman.pdf. 
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suspected of being loyal to Turkey, which lay on the other side of the Iron Curtain.34 As a 
result, during this period, Islamic communities’ leaders, hodjas, were driven 
underground. Despite these efforts, Islam persisted as a religion in the country.  
After the fall of the Communist regime on November 10, 1989, the government, 
pushed by human rights protests, retreated from its policy of forced assimilation and 
allowed the Turks to restore their names, Islamic customs, and the use of their language. 
These changes were legalized through two governmental acts in 1990.35 Overall, during 
the period of transition to democracy, the Muslims in Bulgaria acquired greater religious 
freedom.36 
2. The Bulgarian Mohammedans (Pomaks)  
The origin of Pomaks is controversial, due to the fact that they occupy territories 
in three Balkan states: Bulgaria, Turkey, and Greece (see Figure 4). Thus, these countries 
have their own theories about the origin of Pomaks, based on each state’s national 
interest. The term Pomak is well known in these three countries but, in Bulgaria, the 
Pomak population is called Bulgarian Mohammedans, as the term Pomak has negative 
meaning. Furthermore, Bulgarian politicians prefer to use the term “Bulgarian 
Mohammedans” because it supports the nationalistic theory of forced conversion of 
Bulgarian Christians to Islam.37 However, the term Pomak is used here to provide 
continuity across the three countries where this group resides. 
Pomaks are concentrated in a specific region in Bulgaria known as Rhodope 
Mountain. In theory, this region was exposed to three distinct paths of forced and violent 
                                                 
34 Petrova, “The Integration Process.” 
35 “Names of Bulgarian Nationals Act” (March 5, 1990), The State Council of the People’s Republic 
of Bulgaria. This law allows Muslims in Bulgaria to restore their names, accessed October 10, 2015, 
http://dediserver.eu/hosting/ethnodoc/data/BG19900305.pdf, and the amendment to this law in November, 
1990, that regulates the administrative procedures. 
36 Elena Marushiakova and Vesselin Popov, “Muslim Minorities in Bulgaria,” 2004, 27, 
http://www.balkanethnology.org/files/library/E%20&%20V/Muslims.pdf. 
37 Maria Koinova, Minorities in South-Eastern Europe: Muslims of Bulgaria (Glyka Nera, Greece: 




Islamization and Turkization throughout of the 500-year period of Turkish rule. The 
forced Islamization, as Mutafchieva asserts, was conducted by taking the indigenous 
population as slaves and then making them Muslims. The other line of conversion was by 
intermixed marriages, namely when Turkish soldiers married Bulgarian women.38 
However, the strongest example of Islamization was the military recruitment of Bulgarian 
Christian boys for the Ottoman Army of converted soldiers, known as the Janissary.39   
However, in addition to these believed methods of conversion, there is another 
theory supported by many Bulgarian historians, called “voluntary assimilation.” These 
scholars have relative agreement that the reasons for voluntary affiliation with Islam were 
poverty and the aspiration for higher social status in the society. Muslims in the Ottoman 
Empire had quite a few privileges compared with Christians. The Muslims did not pay 
the state tax that was subjected to non-Muslims. It was easier for people who could not 
afford to pay it simply to accept Islam.40 This form of voluntary Islamization was typical 
throughout most parts of the Ottoman Empire.   
The Turkish view of the origin of Pomaks is completely different from the 
Bulgarian.41 Turks claim that this ethnic group originated from descendants of the 
Cumano-Cupchag Turks, who have nothing in common with Bulgarians.42 At the same 
time, Greeks have their own theory about Pomak Muslims, who inhabited the northern 
territories of Greece. The theory goes that Bulgarian-speaking Muslims are descendants 
of the ancient Greeks and Thracians.43  
Even the Pomaks are divided on the matter of their origin because of so many 
assimilation campaigns and different interpretations of history implemented by the state 
authorities of Bulgaria, Greece, and Turkey. In the case of Bulgaria, the major religious 
group, Eastern Orthodox Christians, still relies on old stereotypes and the belief that 
                                                 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ali Eminov, Turkish and Other Muslim Minorities in Bulgaria (London: Hurst & Company, 1997). 
41 Muyhtar, Human Rights of Muslims.  
42 Ibid., 10. 
43 Ibid. 
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Pomaks are traitors of the faith. This has resulted in ethnic and religious tensions in 
Bulgarian society. This situation is maintained to a certain degree by authorities.  
However, the Pomaks’ position in in today’s Bulgarian society is very complex, 
due to the fact that they do not have a clear ethnic identity. Generally speaking, the 
Pomak ethnic group is not recognized as a minority by the Bulgarian government, as 
shown in 2001 and 2011 censuses.44 Moreover, the population of Pomaks living in a 
compact zone on the Bulgarian south border allows this group to be influenced by other 
neighboring countries. In particular, this closeness to Turkey provides easy opportunities 
for propaganda campaigns, a major concern under Communist rule and a concern today. 
Furthermore, there is evidence to suggest that some Islamic NGOs that use religion as a 
tool for influence have appeared in Bulgaria.45 If true, this is a potential security concern, 
particularly if these NGOs are spreading radical ideologies and increasing their groups’ 
capabilities. These points are further elaborated in Chapter IV. 
3. The Roma Muslims (Gypsies) 
The origin of the Roma ethnic group in Bulgaria is controversial.46 Scholars 
assert that the first migrations of Roma started 1,000 years ago by moving from India to 
Europe.47 During this time, the Roma spread throughout Europe, Asia, and the Balkans. 
Reaching the Balkans during the period of the Byzantine Empire, they started to settle 
there, and some converted to Islam. After the collapse of the Byzantine Empire, the 
Ottoman Empire became a new and powerful hegemon on the Balkan Peninsula; 
however, the Roma population increased in the Balkans due to persecution and slavery in 
different parts of Europe.48 The main factors that attracted Roma to the Balkans were 
                                                 
44 Ibid., 3 
45 Alex Alexiev, “Radical Islam Exists in Bulgaria and It Becomes a Graver Danger for the Society,” 
Focus News Agency, July 20, 2012, http://www.focus-fen.net/opinion/0000/00/00/2957/. 
46 Using the term Roma for the purpose of this research it means Roma who are Muslims (Roma 
Muslims). The biggest share of this minority is Christians.  
47 Muyhtar, Human Rights of Muslims.  
48 Ibid., 11. 
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favorable and tolerant attitudes of the local population and fertile lands. Therefore, the 
Balkans became a “second fatherland for Gypsies.”49  
The Roma presence increased drastically in Bulgaria during Ottoman rule. 
However, different sources provide controversial information about this group. There is 
evidence that the number of Roma was not accurately counted because, in the Ottoman 
Empire, there was no division on ethnical grounds but rather on religious affiliation. 
Despite this, from 1522–1523, tax registers placed the number of Roma households in the 
Empire at 16,591.50 The first recorded census data, after the independence of Bulgaria in 
1878, shows that the Roma represented 1.87 percent of the population or 37, 600 
persons.51  
Although the Roma population was predominantly rural, the Communist 
government provided more opportunities for them to settle in big cities. However, prior 
to Bulgarian independence and the end of the communist era, Roma Muslims, like all 
Muslim minorities, were subject to the same violent and forceful assimilations conducted 
during Bulgarization campaigns. Thus, their religion and names were reputedly 
changed.52 Consequently, identifying the exact number of Roma Muslims is difficult.  
C. BULGARIA’S ETHNIC AND RELIGIOUS DEMOGRAPHICS TODAY 
Recent census data provides a picture of Bulgaria’s ethnic and religious 
demographics following the end of Communist rule. In February 2011, the government 
conducted the 17th “Population and Housing Census” in Bulgarian history and first since 
the country became a member of the European Union. According to the data provided by 
the National Statistics Institute, the total Bulgarian population numbered 7,364,570.53 
Figure 2 shows the population by district. 
                                                 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid., 12. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid. 
53 National Statistical Institute of Bulgaria, “2011 Population Census,” 2. 
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Figure 2.  Bulgaria’s population by district 
 
Source: InvestBulgaria Agency, “Demographic Profile,” accessed July 20, 2015, 
http://www.investbg.government.bg/en/pages/demographic-profile-110.html. 
This map shows that the greatest concentration of citizens is in the capital, Sofia, 
and that the areas of Plovdiv, Varna, and Burgas have the next highest population 
densities. However, overall, Bulgaria is divided into 28 districts, none of which has more 
than 10 percent of the population outside the capital. Furthermore, as described below, 
the districts of Kardzhali and Razgrad have the highest concentration of Muslims, 
although their numbers are relatively small to the overall population.  
The overall population of Bulgaria is further divided into ethnic groups as 
depicted in Table 2. 
Table 2.   Bulgaria’s population by ethnic groups as of February 2011 
Total 
Population Bulgarian Turkish 
Roma/ 
Gypsies Other Not stated 
7,364,570 5,664,624 588,318 325,343 49,304 53,391 
100% 84.8% 8.8% 4.9% 0.7% 0.8% 
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As indicated by the above table, the biggest ethnic group is Bulgarian, which 
constitutes 5,664,624 people, or 84.8 percent of those who responded to the question of 
ethnicity. Compared to the results from the 2001 census, this group has increased by 0.9 
percent.54 People from the Bulgarian ethic group constitute a majority in all districts, 
excluding two, Kardzhali and Razgrad, where Bulgarians represent 30.22 percent and 
43.0 percent respectively. This is also represented in Figure 3.  
Figure 3.  Areas of concentration of Turkish ethnic group in Bulgaria 
 
Source: Wikipedia, “Demographics of Bulgaria,” accessed July 20, 2015, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographics_of_Bulgaria 
The second largest ethnic group, comprised of 588,318 people, described itself as 
ethnic Turks, which is 8.8 percent of the population.55 This ethnic group has decreased 
by 0.6 percent from the previous census.56 Within this group, 63.7 percent of Turks live 
in several districts: Kardzhali, Razgrad, Targovishte, Shumen, Silistra, Dobrich, Ruse, 
and Burgas. These districts constitute the southeastern and northern parts of Bulgaria.  
                                                 




Traditionally the Roma (Gypsies) have occupied the third highest ethnic 
population with 325,343 persons or 4.9 percent of those who responded to the question of 
ethnicity. This group has increased by 0.2 percent from the 2001 census.57 Although the 
distribution of this ethnic group is evenly spread throughout all districts, there are a few 
zones with higher concentrations of Roma. These places are Montana (12.7 percent of the 
population), Sliven (11.8 percent), Dobrich (8.8 percent), and Yambol (8.5 percent). 
Figure 4 provides a visual breakdown of the Roma population in Bulgaria. 
Figure 4.  Roma minority in Bulgaria        
 
Source: Wikipedia, “Romani people in Bulgaria,” accessed July 20, 2015, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Romani_people_in_Bulgaria 
In the 2011 census, 53,391 or 0.8 percent of the people did not declare an ethnic 
affiliation. These people were mostly young and lived predominantly in big cities. Along 
with the other ethnic groups, Russians, Armenians, Greeks, Jews, Macedonians, 
Romanians, and Ukrainians collectively number 49,304 and make up 0.7 percent of the 
population of Bulgaria. 
Unfortunately, no official census data for the number of Pomaks is presented. 
Even though a minority in Bulgaria, this group exists, and its population is significant for 











the purposes of this research, which by raw estimates from different sources is numbered 
at 68,000 or approximately 1 percent of Bulgaria’s population.58 However, this figure is 
not accurate, as Fatme Muyhtar asserts “due to lack of clear sense of self-identity.”59 For 
example, the Bulgarian Mohammedans may mark Turkish or Bulgarian as their ethnic 
affiliation, or just Muslim, because in the census papers there is no an appropriate column 
for their ethnic group. Even though census data on Bulgarian Muslims is scarce, it is well 
known that this ethnic group exists and that it has inhabited a compact zone on Bulgaria’s 
southern border. Figure 5 provides an estimate of Pomak territory.   
Figure 5.  Pomak territory in Bulgaria 
  
Source: Joshua Project, “Pomaks in Bulgaria,” accessed July 23, 2015, 
http://joshuaproject.net/people_groups/14436/BU. 
In addition to addressing ethnic distinctions, the Bulgarian national census also 
polls an individual’s mother tongue and considers it to be the second most important 
ethno-demographic component surveyed in Bulgaria. Despite this, 9.8 percent of people 
                                                 
58 National Statistical Institute of Bulgaria, “2011 Population Census,” 27; Joshua Project, accessed 
July 23, 2015, http://joshuaproject.net/people_groups/14436/BU. 
59 Muyhtar, Human Rights of Muslims. 
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did not answer the question in the 2011 census. The highest share of this percentage 
consisted of young people under 39 and children under nine. The Bulgarian language was 
voluntary pointed out as the mother tongue by 85.2 percent, Turkish by 9.1 percent, and 
Roma by 4.2 percent of the population. The relationship between ethnic belonging and 
mother tongue is provided in Table 3.   
Table 3.   Distribution of the Bulgarian population by ethnic group and 
mother tongue, as of January 2, 2011 
 Mother Tongue 
Ethnic Group Total Bulgarian Turkish Roma Other Not stated 
Total 6,611,513 5,631,759 604,246 280,979 47,071 47,458 
Bulgarian 5,604,300 5,571,049 15,959 7,528 7,511 2,253 
Turkish 585,024 18,975 564,858 549 87 555 
Roma 320,761 24,033 21,440 272,710 1,905 673 
Other 48,321 10,726 397 26 36,196 976 
Not stated 53,107 6,976 1,592 166 1,372 43,001 
Source: National Statistical Institute of Bulgaria, “2011 Population Census,” 26. 
Individuals who answered both questions are included. 
The results in Table 3 above show that the relationship between ethnicity and 
mother tongue was very strong. Therefore, language could be considered one of the most 
important factors in determining an ethnic group’s affiliation and boundaries.   
1. Religious Demography 
Even though the question about religion, interestingly enough, had the highest 
number of non-responders in the 2011 census—21.8 percent of the country’s 7,364,570 
citizens—it is still worth reporting these numbers. The numbers of adherents in different 
religions in Bulgaria are shown in Table 4. 
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Table 4.   Religious groups in Bulgaria as of 2011 
Group Population % of declared % of total 
Christians 4,489,271 77.9% 61% 
Undeclared 1,606,269 - 21.8% 
Areligious 682,162 11.8% 9.3% 
Islam 577,139 10.0% 7.8% 
Others 9,729 0.2% 0.1% 
 Source: National Statistical Institute of Bulgaria, “2011 Population Census,” 26.  
Christians compose the overwhelming majority of the country, and the highest 
share of Christians is Eastern Orthodox, which is 4,374,135 people or 76 percent of those 
who declared their faith. In addition to Eastern Orthodox, 48,945 people or 0.8 percent of 
those who answered described themselves as Catholic, and 64,476 people defined 
themselves as Protestants, or 1.1 percent.  
Persons who consider themselves Muslims constituted 577,139 or 8 percent of the 
population. Of them, 546,004 are Sunni, and 27,407 are Shia. The other 3,727 people 
answered only Muslim, without specifying a denomination. As described above, the 
overwhelming majority of Muslims are Turk (8.8 percent), Pomak (1 percent) or Roma 
(0.9 percent). However, there is evidence to suggest that these numbers may be changing, 
particularly in light of the mass migration of Syrians, Iraqis, and even Afghans to Europe 





2. Middle Eastern and Afghan Refugees 
The terrible conflict in Syria, which started in 2011, has created a humanitarian 
and refugee crisis unseen since the Second World War. The United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates that more than three million Syrians 
have fled their homes and become refugees since the start of the war.60 Until 2015, 
Syria’s neighbors, such as Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon, have absorbed the bulk of this 
crisis.61 However, more recently, Europe has seen a massive influx of refugees from 
Syria and Iraq. The UNHCR asserts that asylum applications in the European Union (EU) 
increased in 2014 by 25 percent from 2013.62 According to the International 
Organization for Migration (IOM), as of the beginning of October 2015, 700,000 
migrants have arrived in Europe; however the exact number is unclear, because some 
migrants have crossed borders undetected.63 The EU has attempted to measure the influx 
of refugees through the number of asylum applications, depicted in Figure 6.  
                                                 
60 Nicole Manie, Francisco Rico-Martinez, Varka Kalaydzhieva, “Syrian Refugees in Bulgaria: A 
Double Edged Sword,” FCJ Refugee Center, accessed October 27, 2015, 
http://www.fcjrefugeecentre.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/AAAREPORT-WITH-FCJ-LOGO.doc.pdf. 
61 United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, Refuge & Hope in the Time of ISIS (Washington, 
DC: U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, January 2015), http://www.usccb.org/about/migration-
policy/upload/Refuge-and-Hope-in-the-Time-of-ISIS.pdf.  
62 UN Refugee Agency, “2015 UNHCR Subregional Operations Profile—Northern, Western, Central 
and Southern Europe,” accessed November 1, 2015, http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e48db16.html. 
63 “Migrant Crisis: Migration to Europe Explained in Graphics,” BBC, November 9, 2015, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34131911. 
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Figure 6.  Asylum claims in Europe, 2015 
 
Source: “Migrant Crisis: Migration to Europe Explained in Graphics,” BBC, November 
9, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34131911. 
Bulgaria, as an EU member is one of Europe’s external borders, as well as 
historically one of the main routes between Europe and Asia. Bulgaria, however, as the 
poorest economy in the EU, has maintained a small-scale refugee protection program, 
and has processed approximately 1,000 asylum applications per year on average for the 
last decade. However, in 2013, the country’s refugee program was overwhelmed when it 
received between 7,000 and 10,000 applications, according to different sources, of which 
around 4,000 claimed to be Syrian.64  
The Bulgarian authorities answered the refugee challenge by increasing the 
number of border policemen and tightening border control.65 As a result, illegal 
immigration dropped by 44 percent, between 2013 and 2014.66 Although these results 
                                                 
64 Ibid. Some sources say 10,000, and another, like the Bulgarian state agency for refugees, estimates 
7,000. See also State Agency for Refugees with the Council of Ministers, accessed November 1, 2015, 
www.aref.government.bg/?cat=21. 
65 United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, Refuge & Hope in the Time of ISIS. 
66 Bulgarian Telegraph Agency, “Number of Illegal Immigrants Detained in 2014 Down by 44% from 
2013,” March 6, 2015, http://www.bta.bg/en/c/DF/id/1030131. 
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were promising, the border police asserted that the number of detained illegal immigrants 
was more than 6,000, most of them Syrians (3,781), followed by Afghans (1,370), Iraqis 
(355), and Turks (102).67 The numbers also show that more than 3,000 illegal immigrants 
attempted to leave Bulgaria undetected but were detained. This suggests that Bulgarian 
security forces, even with relative success, still could not properly handle the problem of 
illegal migration. Illegal migration was, in fact, named as one of the threats to Bulgaria in 
its National Security Strategy of 2011.68  
However, from 2014 until the present, Bulgaria has not been a preferred route for 
migrants for several reasons. First, as a member of the EU and signatory to the 2013 
Dublin Convention, Bulgaria has to comply with strict requirements and procedures for 
asylum seekers. The Dublin Convention requires the first country of arrival to provide 
asylum seekers with protection, which means that even after acquiring asylum status and 
the right to travel freely throughout Europe, the migrant, if he decides to settle in another 
European country and apply for permanent asylum, he/she may be returned to the first 
country of arrival, in this case Bulgaria. As the poorest EU economy, Bulgaria does not 
provide many opportunities for the refugees to settle and improve their livelihood. 
Therefore, migrants aim to reach Western Europe, specifically Germany, and thus bypass 
Bulgaria. Second, Bulgaria has reached the bottom rating of preferred states in the 
“Arabic Handbook of the Refugee Candidate.”69 This is most likely due to its weak 
economy and its lack of resources for migrants. This bottom rating has most likely made 
the country an undesirable location.   
Despite all these reasons, according to official data for 2015, Bulgaria has 12,738 
asylum applications so far and 11,000 more from the previous year.70 The division of 
refugees by countries of origin is depicted in Figure 7. With the onset of the winter in 
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Europe, it may be that more refugees will choose the land route via Bulgaria rather than 
through rough seawaters.  
Figure 7.  Refugees in Bulgaria 
 
Source: State Agency for Refugees with the Council of Ministers, accessed November 1, 
2015, http://www.aref.government.bg/?cat=21. 
The Bulgarian public is not well informed about the real refugee situation that is 
taking place. Therefore, Bulgarians have little sympathy towards the refugees. 
Furthermore, Bulgarian nationalism tends not to support Muslims and fears their 
increasing numbers in the country. This was evident when the Bulgarian Orthodox 
Church called on the government to prevent the influx of Muslim refugees in the 
country.71 The head of the Orthodox Church, Patriarch Neofit, said, “Our government 
should in no way allow more refugees into our country.”72 Bulgarians may also feel 
threatened by the refugees because the country is experiencing a difficult economic 
situation and increasing strain on labor market.  
It is also worth noting that, of the refugees who have chosen to stay in Bulgaria, 
most of the refugees’ children do not attend Bulgarian schools. This is particularly 
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troubling given that children make up 26 percent of asylum seekers in the country. These 
statistics are captured in Figure 8. 
Figure 8.  Refugees in Bulgaria by age and gender 
 
Source: State Agency for Refugees with the Council of Ministers, accessed November 1, 
2015, http://www.aref.government.bg/?cat=21. 
The extent to which these migrants, particularly those who choose to stay, could 
become a security threat to Bulgaria and a source of Islamically motivated terrorism is 
addressed in Chapter IV.  
D. TERRORISM IN BULGARIA  
This section highlights major acts of terrorism and violent unrest that have 
occurred in Bulgaria since World War II. Overall, there were no significant terrorist acts 
in Bulgaria until the late 1980s, when a series of violent clashes between ethnic Turks 
and Bulgarian security forces occurred, as well as terrorist acts. These confrontations 
were the result of policies aimed at forcing the “Bulgarization” of Turks and other 
minorities in the country. Following Bulgaria’s transition to democracy in 1991 and the 
creation of political parties for Turks and Roma, these violent clashes and terrorist acts 
largely stopped. Beginning in 2010, however, Bulgaria saw a new wave of terrorism that 
appears to be motivated by Islamic radicalism, including ISIS. 
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1. Terrorism from 1980 to 1989  
Beginning in the 1980s, Bulgaria began to experience a series of ethnic clashes, 
including violent confrontations between its Muslim minority and the government. As 
previously mentioned, the Bulgarian Communist party unsuccessfully attempted to 
“Bulgarize” the entire population throughout its 45 years of rule, including restrictions on 
Turkish dress and the limited practice of Islam. This process came to its peak during 1984 
and 1985 and the so-called “Revival Process,” which attempted the Bulgarization of 
names of Turks in the country. The Turkish language, religious practices and wearing 
traditional attire were all banned.73 The result was unrest among the Turkish minority, 
which culminated in 1989 with public protests. The government reacted violently, and 
protesters clashed with police, causing several hundred casualties. Following these 
violent confrontations, approximately 350,000 Bulgarian Turks immigrated to Turkey. 
Later, roughly 150,000 returned to Bulgaria, while the others opted to stay in Turkey.74 
In addition to these violent confrontations between Turks in Bulgaria and the 
government, low-level terrorist acts began occurring in Bulgaria. These incidents were 
exclusively the acts of pro-Turkish extremist groups (PTEGs) that aimed to compel the 
Bulgarian communist party to abandon its Bulgarization policy. Specifically, 42 
clandestine pro-Turkish groups were discovered having committed terrorist acts. Some 
members of these groups were ultimately convicted of sedition and planning or carrying 
out terrorism, bombings, and contact with Turkish agents in Bulgaria. According to the 
investigation of the State Security Agency, one group, code-named by the Agency 
“Abominable,” carried out numerous terrorist attacks. Abominable became particularly 
known for its ability to carry out two terrorist attacks simultaneously in different parts of 
the country, in what could be called a terrorist offensive campaign.75 
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Figure 9.  PTEG members who were found guilty for Bunovo train station 
bombing 
 
Source: Desant, “The Faces and the Fate of Assassins,” March 9, 2013, 
http://www.desant.net/show-news/26758/. 
During the Revival Process, the most notorious attacks between 1984 and 1989 
were conducted by PTEGs on the train station in Plovdiv in 1984, followed by another 
attack one hour later at the Varna airport. In 1985, a train was bombed when passing the 
village of Bunovo, and in the same year a bomb was placed in a hotel in the town of 
Sliven.76 These coordinated terrorist attacks, followed by successive attacks, are unusual 
in Bulgaria. These acts are summarized in Table 5.  
                                                 




Table 5.    Terrorist activities in Bulgaria, 1983–1989  
Year Group Actions 
1983 PTEGs Blackmailing the government 
1983 PTEGs Forest fire—750 acres of forest burned, propaganda 
1983 PTEGs Unsuccessful attempt to sabotage railway transport network 
1984 PTEGs Blackmailing the government 
1984 PTEGs Bomb explosions at Plovdiv train station and Varna Airport  
1984 PTEGs Bomb explosions in Benkovski Church  
1984 PTEGs Unsuccessful attempt to sabotage Aytos train station 
1985 PTEGs Bomb explosions at Bunovo train station 
1985 PTEGs Hotel bomb explosions in Sliven 
1985 PTEGs Supermarket bomb explosions in Burgas 
1985 PTEGs IED activated at a children’s playground  
1985 PTEGs Unsuccessful attempt to sabotage Karnobat train station 
1986 PTEGs Unsuccessful IED in Druzba hotel, Varna  
1986 PTEGs Poisoning of water installations, Lyulyakovo village, propaganda 
1987 PTEGs Kidnapping of two children 
 
During the five years of the campaign for forced renaming of Bulgarian Turks, a 
total of 29 people were killed—a woman in the bombing of the station in Plovdiv; eight 
protesters (including a baby) in the campaign period from December 24, 1984, to January 
19, 1985; seven people (including two children) in the bombing of the Bunovo train 
station; three in November 1988 and nine protesters and soldiers from May 19–27, 1989.  
At the end of 1989, the government issued a decree that proclaimed the 
restoration of the names of Bulgarian Turks. In the following months, the government 
also adopted a series of measures to help with their reincorporation into Bulgarian 
society. These gestures were the beginning of the “Bulgarian Ethnic Model,” which was 
designed to prevent ethnic clashes in the future. As professor Anna Krasteva describes, 
“The Bulgarian ethnic model was the most successful political product of Bulgarian 
fragile democracy.”77 
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2. Terrorism in Bulgaria from 1989 to the Present 
Following Bulgaria’s independence from the Soviet Union in 1989, and especially 
throughout the early 1990s, Bulgaria faced constant political instability and strikes. The 
old Communist party still exercised a powerful influence. Compounding this political 
instability, “there was little tangible progress with economic reform.”78  
However, some important developments led to a reduction in ethnic clashes and 
terrorism. In 1990, the Turks created their own political party, the opposition movement 
of Bulgarian Turks—the MRF—and Ahmed Dogan was elected as its leader.79 Some of 
the Parliament members from the United Democratic Forces Party made an appeal to the 
Constitutional Court of Bulgaria, claiming that the MRF was unconstitutional according 
to Bulgarian law, specifically in regard to the following articles:  
1. Article 11.4 of the Constitution prohibits formation of the parties based on 
ethnic, religious and racial line. 
2.  It grants equal rights to all Bulgarian citizens with no privileges on 
grounds of race, nationality, ethnic self-identification, religion, sex etc.  
3. It prescribes the obligatory studying and usage of Bulgarian language, but 
at the same time it grants the right to all to study and use their own mother 
tongue alongside Bulgarian (Art.36).  
4. It guarantees the right of all Bulgarian citizens to develop their own 
national culture (Art. 54).80 
However, despite these concerns, Bulgaria’s Constitutional Court approved the 
MRF, and it became a legitimate part of the Bulgarian political scene. The MRF claims to 
be open to all the citizens of Bulgaria.81 The Roma also founded their own party in 1998, 
called Euroroma. It has a mixed membership, and its leader is Cvetelin Kanchev.82 
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Despite the progress made in reducing ethnic tensions in Bulgaria, the country 
still experienced a series of terrorist attacks. The worst attack was thwarted before it was 
executed. In December 1990, law enforcement received intelligence that three hotels in 
Sofia—the Sheraton, the Interpred, the New Omni—and the U.S. Embassy had been 
targeted for an attack. Ten terrorists from five different countries were detained in the 
Grand Hotel Sofia shortly before their planned actions.83  
Of the attacks that occurred, several were particularly damaging. On July 9, 1995, 
a bomb exploded in front of Maritza magazine in Plovdiv. Several business offices were 
destroyed; the damage, however, was only material because the explosion occurred at 
midnight when nobody was there. On July 17, 1996, a bomb went off at the shopping 
center in Sofia, which caused significant material damage to 15 shops, without victims or 
casualties. Neither of these attacks, however, was religiously motivated.  
One act, though, was clearly perpetrated on behalf of religious motives. On 
December 6, 1996, an IED exploded in the porch of the Grand Mosque in Kazanlak, with 
no casualties. This is the only attack during this timeframe that is believed to have been 
religiously motivated, but it was directed against the Muslim minority in Bulgaria, not 
perpetrated by them. These terrorist acts are summarized in Table 6.   
Table 6.   Terrorist activities in Bulgaria, 1989–2004 
Year Group Actions 
1991 Unknown International terrorists captured before blowing up three 
hotels in Sofia  
1995 Unknown Bomb explosion in the building of Maritza magazine, Plovdiv 
1996 Unknown Bomb explosion in the market center, Sofia 
1996 Unknown Bomb explosion in the Grand Mosque  
1997 Unknown IED found close to the airport  
1998 Unknown Bomb explosion in the building of Trud newspaper office 
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From 1998 to the present, Bulgaria has seen an increase in the number of 
religiously motivated terrorist acts. One of the first incidents occurred on July 18, 2012, 
when a bus carrying 42 Israelis was attacked by three terrorists, killing five Israelis, as 
well as a Bulgarian citizen, and injuring 32 others. No organization publicly claimed 
responsibility for the attack.84 However, it is believed that the perpetrators, who were 
carrying Canadian and Lebanese passports, were affiliated with the Lebanese Hizbollah. 
In 2013, another incident occurred at the National Palace in Sofia. The MRF 
conducted a political conference, and during the speech of the movement’s leader, 
Ahmed Dogan, a young man of Turkish ethnicity, Oktay Enimehmedov, stormed the 
stage and pointed a gun at Dogan. The weapon misfired, and the leader had time to react 
and “hit the would-be assassins hand out of the way.”85 Before Enimehmedov could try a 
second shot, security guards and some of the delegates succeeded in tackling the assassin. 
It is still unknown what his motives were.86   
Figure 10.  The unsuccessful attack on Ahmed Dogan 
 
Source: “Failed Assassination Attempt on Ahmed Dogan,” YouTube, accessed August 
30, 2015, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hBd6ptb7-QA 
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However, the most recent incident of potential terrorism is also the most 
troubling. In November 2014, a cell loyal to ISIS was discovered. Reuters announced, 
“Bulgaria charges Imam, six others with supporting ISIS.”87 Specifically, the Bulgarian 
Imam, Ahmed Musa Ahmed, was detained by security forces and charged with 
supporting ISIS. The Imam was a former Christian of Roma descent, but he converted to 
Islam in 2000 and was teaching the ideas of radical Islam. Bulgarian security forces 
raided more than 40 homes and a mosque as part of this overall operation. There they 
found books, computers, and propaganda with the logo of the Islamic State. Ahmed Musa 
was sentenced to one year in prison for promoting a “radical ideology in mosques, 
conferences and cafes between March 2008 and October 2010.”88 In addition, Musa was 
given an additional three year term for violating the terms of his probation from a 
previous sentence for spreading radical Islam. Despite this, he has “remained free 
pending an appeal.”89 Additionally, 26 people were held and 30 witnesses questioned. 
These acts are summarized in Table 7. 
Table 7.   Terrorist activities in Bulgaria, 2004–2015 
Year Group Actions 
2012 Hezbollah  Attacked Israeli tourist bus at Sarafovo Airport 
2013  Lone Wolf  Assassination attempt on Dogan 
2014 ISIS  12 imams detained for radicalism 
  
This last incident demonstrates that Bulgaria has entered a new era in terrorist 
activity. Whereas previous acts were partially the result of government policies targeting 
Turkish minorities in the country, and possibly Turkish involvement in Bulgaria, these 
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recent attacks came from Arab influences, and in the 2014 raid, individuals were believed 
to be connected with the Islamic State.  
Alongside these developments, there is evidence to suggest that money from Arab 
countries, particularly countries in the Arabian Peninsula, is being sent to Muslim groups 
inside Bulgaria. As Kristen Ghodsee asserts in her field study on Bulgarian Muslims in 
2004–2005, since 1989 there was a “tsunami of foreign aid” from Western as well as 
Middle Eastern NGOs into the Balkan countries with Muslim populations.90 Specifically, 
she believes that Bulgarian Muslims sought help from foreign Islamic foundations and 
NGOs to offset poor economic conditions in the country.  
One example comes from 1996, when the Bulgarian deputy prime minister and 
the chairman of the Supreme Theological Council of Muslims in Bulgaria met with 
representatives of the Muslim World League in order to discuss a “possibility of closer 
relations between Saudi Arabia and Bulgaria.”91 Because there is no effective regulation 
and control of foreign aid and donations in Bulgaria, it is difficult to estimate the exact 
amount of NGO aid coming to Bulgaria. However, the Pomaknews Agency claims that 
currently “there are three legally registered Islamic NGOs,” which are active in 
Bulgaria.92 The first NGO is Taiba, which is funded by donations from Saudi Arabia. 
The organization was registered in 1995, and it was a “successor to two NGOs (Dar al-
Irshad and Al Waqf al-Islamiyya).”93 Bulgarian Security Services’ reports indicate that 
this organization has had links to extremist groups in the Middle East. The second NGO, 
called Neduwa, was registered in 1994 and also has close relations to Saudi Arabia.94 
The third NGO, Al-Waqf al-Islamiyya, was banned in 1994 and then permitted to “re-
register in Bulgaria in 2002 under the terms of a new law on religions.”95  
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Even though detailed information about activities of informal Islamic NGOs is 
difficult to find, the evidence shows that the emergence of new mosques, religious 
schools, and the publication of Islamic magazines are activities sponsored by outside 
sources. These organizations may be attempting to change moderate religious views of 
Bulgarian Muslims.  
Focusing specifically on these points, there are scholars who argue, to differing 
degrees, that radical Islam is a threat to state security. Alex Alexiev, for example, argues 
that the biggest threat to Bulgaria comes from its neighbor, Turkey.96 He asserts, “The 
grand geopolitical scheme of the AKP (Justice and Development Party), known as ‘Neo-
Ottomanism,’”97 is based on the radicalization of Muslim minorities in neighboring 
countries such as Bulgaria. Another supporter of this idea is Konstantin Chakarov, who 
talks about a secret Turkish plan during the Cold War named “Gladis,” which included 
creating sleeper cells of ethnic Turks in Bulgaria to destabilize the country through 
violence acts.98  
Ali Bulac, a Turkish journalist, counters that Alex Alexiev interprets the facts to 
suit his argument. Bulac writes that neither Muslims nor the Turkish president Erdogan is 
a threat to Bulgaria’s government. Bulac argues that Alexiev is trying to influence U.S. 
and European audiences by presenting Erdogan as against secular democracy and 
possessing a secret agenda for the Islamization of Turkey. Bulac further notes that 
Alexiev does not mention the Muslims in Bulgaria as part of the problem because of his 
Bulgarian origin. Also, he denies Alexiev’s claim that the number of mosques in Bulgaria 
has increased because of external funding from radical sources. Instead, he argues that 
the increase in mosques is due to the growing Bulgarian Muslim population.99  
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By contrast, Valeri Ratchev argues that the biggest threat comes from Bulgaria’s 
security posture. Specifically, there is a technological gap and an old security paradigm in 
the Bulgarian Security Services, which is preventing the state from preparing for 
domestic and international threats.100 He notes that the capabilities of the security sector 
are overestimated and that politicians and the wider society are unaware of this 
capabilities gap. The reduced budgets of the Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Defense 
demonstrate that the Bulgarian government does not recognize a serious threat to the 
country.101 Instead, Bulgarians rely largely on their NATO allies to protect them. 
However, there is reason to believe that Bulgaria’s security is under threat. For 
example, the central news channel, NOVATV, announced on October 25, 2014, that 
there is evidence that ISIS has at least 40 Bulgarian members.102 The Bulgarian minister 
of defense verified this information and asked for an emergency meeting of the Security 
Council to discuss and analyze the threat posed by ISIS.103 In November 2014, the news 
agency Reuters described the story of a Bulgarian Imam, Ahmed Musa Ahmed, who had 
been detained by security forces and charged with supporting the Islamic State.104 These 
reports suggest that Bulgaria, like many other countries, faces potential security threats 
posed by the rise of radical Islam, and ISIS in particular.  
All of these points are further used to analyze Bulgaria’s threat from Islamic 
extremism in Chapter IV.  
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E. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has provided a brief overview of the history of the Bulgarian state 
with the aim of understanding the emergence of its Muslim minority, along with the 
changes in terrorist acts and perpetrators over time. In doing so, this chapter has 
highlighted the recent rise of terrorist groups and acts affiliated with Arabs and the 
Islamic State.  
The next chapter offers suggestions for Bulgarian security forces to use this model 
and what intelligence to look for as the country continues to struggle with the rise of 




A. APPLYING THE REMM MODEL TO ASSESS FUTURE ISLAMIC 
THREATS IN BULGARIA 
This thesis began by providing a brief overview of Bulgaria, particularly the 
historical events that created the country’s religious and ethnic diversity and its Muslim 
minority in particular. Chapter II provided a brief overview of key literature on 
religiously motivated violence. It focused specifically on fundamentalism theory and 
Gregg’s conditions that lead to interpretations that call for religiously motivated violence. 
From this literature review, the chapter presented a basic model of radicalization and 
terrorism. The model focused on four variables in particular: the creation of groups, 
which consist of leaders and followers; intentions, especially radical interpretations of a 
faith that call for violence; the acquisition of capabilities that can lead to violence; and 
the selection of targets for terrorist acts. Chapter III then discussed the contemporary 
religious and ethnic demographics of Bulgaria, in addition to highlighting major violent 
acts in Bulgaria from 1980 to the present. 
This chapter takes the above model and uses it to assess the potential threat to 
Bulgaria from Islamically motivated terrorism. In particular, it aims to answer the 
following questions: First, how vulnerable are Bulgaria’s Muslim minority groups to 
radicalization? Are there leaders in Bulgaria who pose a threat by forming radical 
groups? Second, what are the intentions of Bulgaria’s Muslim minorities? Do they have 
violent intentions towards the government? Third, what are the capabilities of Bulgaria’s 
Muslim minorities? Do they possess the capabilities to engage in terrorist activities? 
Fourth, what may be the potential targets of Islamic terrorists based on the target 
selection of terrorist groups in the past? Each of these questions is addressed below, 
focusing on the key variables of the REMM model.  
1. Bulgaria’s Muslim Minority Groups   
Bulgaria’s Muslim minority groups have experienced systematic discrimination 
and marginalization from the Bulgarian government and society in the past. As described 
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in Chapter II, during the 45 years of Communist rule, Muslim minorities in Bulgaria were 
exposed to a constant and forceful assimilation campaign. The narrative that supported 
this campaign was that there was no Turkish ethnicity, but “Turkicized” Bulgarians, 
which justified the Communist party’s policy of Bulgarization. The end of the Cold War 
and the introduction of democracy saw the end of oppressive policies toward Muslim 
minorities in Bulgaria. Moreover, ethnic Turks and the Roma both created political 
parties to address their grievances through the political system. This combination of 
changed policies and the end of systematic discrimination of these groups, coupled with 
political representation, appears to have reduced ethnic tensions among these groups in 
Bulgaria. 
However, social inequality and isolation of ethnic Turkish groups and Bulgarian 
Muslims (Roma and Pomaks) remain concerns. In some regions of Bulgaria, in 
Kardzhali, for example, the Turkish population is Muslim and currently has poor access 
to both resources and information. In these communities, the access to information occurs 
largely in the local mosque, which is often built with money from foreign charities, 
possibly creating the conditions for foreign influence among these groups. Furthermore, a 
Bulgarian think tank reports that some of these groups have satellite access to Turkish 
television, further presenting the opportunity for foreign influence.105  
Bulgarian Mohammedans—the Pomaks—are another marginalized population. 
As described in Chapter II, the Bulgarian government does not officially recognize this 
ethnic group, even though it constitutes around 1 percent of the population and occupies 
territory in three Balkan states, Bulgaria, Greece, and Turkey. The Pomaks, subjected to 
an even worse assimilation campaign than ethnic Turks in the 1980s, are concentrated in 
specific region next to Bulgaria’s southern border, known as the Rhodope Mountain. This 
ethnic group’s proximity to the border may make it susceptible to foreign influence, 
particularly those Pomaks in other countries, including Turkey.     
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Perhaps even greater than the ethnic Turks and Pomaks is the marginalization of 
Roma Muslims in Bulgaria, who live in large ghettos, primarily in the capital. According 
to a World Bank survey, Roma are more than 10 times poorer than ethnic Bulgarians, and 
their marginalization increases.106 Huge masses of Roma people have no work and are, 
therefore, susceptible to influence of individuals and groups that offer resources. There is 
evidence to suggest that religious groups, both Christian Protestant sects and Islamic 
groups, are targeting the Roma.107 Furthermore, Wikileaks revealed U.S. concerns that, 
as some of the poorest and most marginalized of Bulgaria’s population, the Roma in the 
region are susceptible to influence by various Islamic charities, which could help 
different radical forces penetrate the region.108  
Alongside Bulgaria’s Muslim minorities, the growing number of Muslim migrants 
to Bulgaria forms another potential threat source for Islamically motivated terrorism. This 
includes, particularly, Syrians, Iraqis, and even Afghans.109 Most recently, in November 
2015, Bulgarian security forces shot dead an Afghan migrant trying to cross the border 
from Turkey into Bulgaria. This migrant was part of an illegal group of 54 men ranging 
from 20 to 30 years old. It is believed that this all-male group of military-aged men may 
have had nefarious intentions.110   
Leaders are also an important consideration and necessary component for the rise 
of Islamic groups and terrorist acts. With the rise of transnational terrorism, educated 
intellectuals have played a particularly important spiritual and political role, especially 
towards poor and marginalized populations. Huntington notes, for example, that a 
significant part of the university aged youth in Islamic countries are scientists, technical 
engineers, scholars, and lawyers. In many radicalizing communities, the elderly are not 
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the most zealous but, rather, it is the young people.111 Thus, young and educated 
Islamists play an important role in creating ideologues by importing radical ideas among 
the masses, by distributing significant numbers of publications, and by creating powerful 
organizations that use the most modern methods of propaganda and asymmetrical 
warfare.112   
In Bulgaria, Muslim elites have historically been associated with a strong secular 
tradition. However, Bulgarian Muslims are now going abroad to study in universities in 
the Middle East or Turkey.113 In these universities, they could be exposed to the 
influence of radical ideas, and thus become radicalized, which could turn them into 
leaders of violent Islamic groups in Bulgaria. It is not clear if the Bulgarian government 
is keeping track of individuals who go to religious schools abroad in order to identify 
what they are learning or what their intentions are when they return. 
Given this discussion, the Bulgarian government and security forces should be 
looking at the following:  
• Disfranchised Muslim Roma and Pomak minorities, particularly those 
who are receiving money and other resources from foreign Islamic 
charities.  
• Migrants and refugees who are also receiving aid from Islamic charities.  
• Individuals who have gone abroad to Islamic schools for higher education. 
• Foreign NGOs, particularly Islamic charities. 
2. Intentions 
Building on these points, several external influences could be shaping the 
intentions of Bulgaria’s Muslim minority. As described in Chapter II, a 2014 raid 
revealed that ISIS was present in Bulgaria and is working with the local population, 
particularly Roma Muslim communities. This case suggests that Bulgaria, like many 
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other countries, is facing potential security threats posed by the rise of radical Islam, and 
ISIS in particular.  
Perhaps ISIS’ rigorous propaganda campaign poses the greatest threat to Bulgaria. 
As stated, ISIS has placed Bulgaria within its sights and named it as part of the Caliphate. 
Furthermore, as suggested by the 2014 raid, it is evident that ISIS already has leaders and 
followers in the country. Clearly, ISIS has demonstrated that it has violent intentions—
against governments, monitories, and co-religionists who do not subscribe to their 
interpretation of Islam. The presence of ISIS in Bulgaria, therefore, shows that Islamic 
groups with violent intentions are in the country.  
In addition to ISIS, several scholars suggest that Turkey may be a source of 
radicalization. As described in Chapter II, the expert Alex Alexiev argues that the biggest 
threat to Bulgaria stems from Turkey’s attempts to influence the Bulgarian Muslim 
minorities, particularly those following the rise of Erdogan’s Islamically-based party. 
Alexiev argues that Turkey aims to implement “the grand geopolitical scheme of the 
AKP (Justice and Development Party), known as ‘Neo-Ottomanism.’”114 However, 
others suggest that Alexiev’s ideas are overblown and when compared to groups like 
ISIS, not the biggest threat of Islamic terrorism that Bulgaria faces. 
Also important to the discussion of intentions is the rise of Islamic schools in 
Bulgaria. There is evidence to suggest that several of Bulgaria’s Muslim minority groups, 
including refugees, are either not attending Bulgarian public schools, or are not 
adequately learning in them. Currently about 2 percent of the population in Bulgaria is 
illiterate.115 Among the vulnerable areas are Turkish neighborhoods and villages, where 
children up to fourth grade cannot learn to read or write in Bulgarian. Alongside this 
trend is the rise of Islamic schools. In Bulgaria, there are currently three registered 
Muslim middle schools—in Shumen, in Momchilgrad, and in Ruse—and the Ministry of 
Education has approved their programs. In these schools, Bulgarian Muslims study Islam 
and are trained as Imams. However, alongside these schools, at least several Islamic 
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schools not registered and outside the control of the state exist.116 Marginalized groups in 
Bulgaria, particularly the Roma, may find these schools inviting, especially because 
Roma are not well integrated in public schools and more importantly, because they 
provide free education, food, shelter and clothing, which attract families who have no 
other prospects for their children. In many cases, Imams are the instructors, and no one 
controls how they interpret the Quran to children. In these schools, girls are veiled in 
typical Arabic style, which is unusual for Muslims in any part of Bulgaria. Therefore, 
there is growing concern that these schools are creating fundamentalists. Moreover, 
graduates of these schools are often sent to Arab countries to continue their education. 
Thus, there is concern that traditional and moderate Islam in Bulgaria is being replaced 
by versions coming from the Middle East, which are much more radical.117  
Given this discussion, the Bulgarian government and security forces should 
undertake the following actions to monitor fundamentalist intentions within its borders. 
• Monitor religious schools, including the identification of who is teaching 
there and what is being taught.   
• Improve the database for Bulgarian citizens who study abroad in religious 
universities.  
• Monitor religious publications and broadcasts for ISIS inspired messages. 
• Put more effort into enforcing compulsory education for minorities, 
especially the Roma, in public schools.  
• Invest more time and resources to determine the grievances of Muslim 
minorities, in order to prevent violent intentions against the government 
and other ethnic groups.   
• Take note of the veiling of females and the adoption of similar 
conservative Muslim attire for men not typical of Bulgaria’s Muslim 
minority. 
 
                                                 




Bulgaria has several challenges to controlling the capabilities of potential Islamic 
terrorists within its borders. First, the lack of sufficient control over the country’s “gray” 
economy, along with high levels of crime, and the presence of organized cross-border 
criminal groups could lead to cooperation between individuals and organizations for the 
purposes of terrorism. Furthermore, this environment allows groups with violent 
intentions to easily acquire materials and human resources.  
In addition to organized crime, Bulgaria also faces a potential threat from Islamic 
charities, as previously stated. Not only do these charities come with ideas and influence, 
but they also often have resources. In particular, some Islamic NGOs provide needed 
resources to poor local Muslim communities, including food and clothing. However, they 
also are building mosques and paying money to women who veil.118 It is strongly 
believed that charities that provide humanitarian assistance and money increase their 
influence with that target population.119 This influence could potentially lead to violence 
done in the name of a group.  
Given this discussion, Bulgarian security forces should focus their efforts on the 
following: 
• Monitoring criminal groups and smugglers for the influx of weapons that 
could be used for terrorist activities. 
• Identifying vulnerabilities of the Muslim minorities in the country and 
addressing these vulnerabilities as best as possible, particularly groups that 
lack basic resources.  
4. Targeting 
The last and very important variable in the REMM model is targeting. Having all 
these favorable conditions for the existence of radical groups in Bulgaria, such groups 
have to determine where to channel their violence. There are many important strategic 
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targets in Bulgaria. For example, the country has a nuclear power plant, called Kozlodui, 
located in the northwestern part of the country. This site could be a target for Muslim 
groups that wish to cause significant harm and possibly create apocalyptic conditions. 
Another strategic target could be an oil refinery in the sea town of Burgas. If this site 
were targeted, it would cripple Bulgarian society and its economy by causing a 
significant shortage of oil in the country.  
However, perhaps the most likely target of Islamic terrorists would be one of 
Bulgaria’s most prize resources. Because of its geographical location, Bulgaria has four 
beautiful seasons, which makes the country a preferred tourist destination. For example, 
many tourists travel to the Black Sea resorts from Western countries such as the United 
Kingdom, as well as from Russia and Romania, year-round. British tourists, in particular, 
travel to Bulgaria’s winter resorts, especially its ski resorts. In recent years, Bulgaria has 
hosted several World and European Cup ski races, which attract additional tourists from 
all over the world.120 
Tourist sights are especially soft targets for terrorists; they offer several effects at 
once. For example, as described in Chapter II, a suicide bomber targeted a busload of 
Israeli tourists that was believed to be connected to the Lebanese Hizbollah.121 This 
incident greatly embarrassed Bulgarian security forces, who were unable to prevent the 
attack and also injured Bulgaria’s tourism industry.   
Furthermore, ISIS sympathizers have demonstrated the ability to target tourist 
destinations. In March 2015, for example, militants killed 22 tourists by attacking a 
museum in Tunisia’s capital. In June 2015, a second attack took place on Sousse beach in 
a Tunisian resort, which killed 39, again manly foreign tourists.122 More recently, ISIS 
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took credit for a plane crash in the Sinai Peninsula in October 2015 that killed 224.123 
Whether or not it is true, the effect was to chase tourists out of Egypt, greatly affecting 
the country’s tourism industry.124 Islamic terrorist groups in Bulgaria could follow these 
examples and target Bulgaria’s tourism industry, which would deal a major blow to its 
economy. 
With these points in mind, Bulgarian security forces should focus on the 
following: 
• Improving security in the following areas: the Pamporovo winter resort, 
which is located in the middle of the Rhodope Mountain (where Pomaks 
are concentrated), and the Varna airport and Black Sea resorts. 
• Improve security around Bulgaria’s nuclear power plant and oil refinery. 
B. CONCLUSION 
Bulgaria faces several challenges in meeting these potential security threats posed 
by the very real possibility of Islamic terrorism. First, Bulgaria has a lack of security 
forces. Moreover, Bulgaria has an insufficient budget for its security forces. Even though 
heavily underfunded, the security forces face new governmental budgetary cuts and 
structural reform in a time when the threat posed by Islamic terrorism is real.125 The 
Bulgarian government has to change existing security laws and concepts in order to 
improve cooperation between security services such as the border police and the Army. 
Specifically, the Army should be involved in counterterrorism and intelligence gathering 
operations in the country during peacetime.  
Second, Bulgaria needs to better understand its Muslim minority and work to 
decrease their sense of alienation. The Bulgarian authorities must put more effort into 
meeting the basic needs of the people from minorities and implement working integration 
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programs. The main focus should be education, specifically by increasing the number of 
educated Roma children as one of the main factors for better integration. 
Third, Bulgaria has a weak economy, which limits the amount of resources it can 
provide to help minorities. In a time of economic shortcomings, the Bulgarian 
government has to provide as much funding as possible to official Muslim organizations 
in order to compete with foreign NGOs. 
Fourth, Bulgaria needs to devise a strategy for dealing with immigrants, because 
this problem will not go away soon and is a potential source of instability and even 
terrorism. Specifically, as an EU country, Bulgaria needs to be active in the debates for 
managing the increased influx of migrants and helping to devise a comprehensive EU 
strategy for managing this ongoing crisis.  
Fifth, Bulgaria needs to better monitor foreign influence. NGOs, Bulgarians 
traveling abroad, and the access to radicalizing material are all important sources of 
influence that should be better understood and monitored. In a democracy, it is difficult to 
weigh freedoms against security threats. And Bulgaria, just like many other countries, 
needs to strike a balance between ensuring the security of its people without impinging 
on their right to practice religion or travel abroad. The best path to ensuring liberties and 
securities is to better assess and understand the threat posed to Bulgaria by Islamically 
motivated terrorism.   
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